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Abstract
This paper examines symmetric Nash equilibria of a two-country
model of fiscal competition with a continuum of taxable commodities
in each country. The innovation is to impose a uniformity restriction
that there can be only two rates of tax on the different commodities,
a positive rate and the zero-rate. The main results characterize, under
two alternative modes of taxation, the equilibrium fiscal rules chosen
by countries, i.e., the level of the positive rate and the set of taxed
commodities. Under the origin principle, it appears that the equilib-
rium fiscal base is narrower than the optimal one, and consequently the
tax rate is too high. By contrast, under the destination principle, the
optimal rule is implemented.
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1 Introduction
The literature on non-cooperative tax setting usually assumes that different
goods can be taxed at different rates (Mintz and Tulkens, 1986; Kanbur and
Keen, 1993). In the European Union, however, the VAT harmonization policy
imposes strong restrictions on the number of VAT rates that can be used. Ac-
cording to the 2006/112/EC Directive ‘on the common system of value added
tax’, goods subject to VAT typically must be taxed at one single standard
(high) rate. In addition, Member States are allowed to apply one or two re-
duced (low) rates to a few goods specified in a restricted list. As a rough
approximation, therefore, the EU legislation imposes the uniformity restric-
tion that there can be only two VAT rates on the different goods, a positive
rate and the zero-rate. The innovation of this paper is to analyze commodity
tax competition in the presence of such a uniformity restriction.
This restriction implies that each country has to choose not only the level
of its own tax rate, but also its own tax base, i.e., the set of goods taxed at the
positive rate. Both decisions closely rely on the mode of competition under
scrutiny. We consider two alternative modes of competition. The first one is
the ‘destination principle’, by which goods are taxed at the point at which
they are consumed. The second one is the ‘origin principle’, by which taxes
are imposed at the source from which the goods are produced.
Although there are particular circumstances under which these principles
are equivalent (Shibata, 1967; Whalley, 1979; Berglas, 1981), it is now clear
that no general arguments emerge in favor of one or the other regime (Lock-
wood, 1993, 2001; Keen and Lahiri, 1998). On the one hand, the destination
principle is difficult to manage in the Single Market because of the lack of
barrier controls. On the other hand, under the origin principle, the theoretical
literature highlights a sub-efficient process of downward tax competition which
results in too low rates (Mintz and Tulkens, 1986; Crombrugghe and Tulkens,
1990; Kanbur and Keen, 1993; Haufler, 1994, 1998; Nielsen, 2001). These
considerations may explain why the current EU ‘transitional VAT System’ ac-
tually maintains both modes of competition. It is indeed origin-based for sales
to final consumers and for most service, and destination-based for operations
between taxable persons and firms.
The present paper considers a stylized two-country model of commodity
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tax competition with a continuum of taxable commodities with domestic and
foreign varieties, but only one available tax rate in each country, in addition to
the zero-rate. There is no intermediate inputs, so that the tax system can be
thought of as VAT, or more generally any kind of indirect tax system where
there are a few rates of tax, e.g. the sales tax. We compare the optimal fiscal
rule, which maximizes the joint welfare of countries, with equilibrium fiscal
rules in either mode of competition. In the presence of a restricted number of
tax rates, competition partly falls back onto the tax base, providing countries
an incentive to narrow their tax base and set higher rates. We show that,
under the origin principle, the tax base (though not the tax rate) is narrower
than the optimal one. Under this mode, if home and foreign goods of some
variety are high substitutes, then they will be tax-free in equilibrium, whereas
they should be taxed. Under the destination principle, the equilibrium rule is
optimal.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the economic framework, and
defines the optimal tax rule and the equilibrium tax rules under the destination
and the origin principles. It is proven that the optimal tax rule is implemented
under the destination principle. In order to examine how the equilibrium tax
rule under the origin principle departs from the optimal one, Section 3 is
specialized to the case where the elasticities of substitution between home and
foreign goods differ across varieties; for instance, home and foreign ‘Public
Transport’ are lower substitutes than home and foreign ‘Clothing’. In this
case, the optimal tax base comprises all commodities, and it is larger than
the equilibrium base. Section 4 considers two extensions. First it shows that,
under the origin principle, any reform which imposes a larger base is Pareto-
improving. Second, it provides a characterization of the equilibrium tax rule in
the more general configuration where goods differ according to both elasticity
of substitution and price elasticity.
2 Framework
This section describes the economic environment under scrutiny, and compares
the optimal fiscal rule, i.e., the level of this rate and the set of taxed commodi-
ties which maximize the joint welfare of both countries, with those arising from
tax competition under the destination and the origin principles.
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2.1 Household problem
Countries are labeled ‘home’ (h) and ‘abroad’ (A). Throughout the paper, a
lower case letter applies to goods produced domestically while an upper case
applies to goods produced in the foreign country. We focus on the efficiency
viewpoint. Each country is therefore populated by one single representative
household. The preferences of household i (i = h,A) are represented by∫
g∈G
ugi (x
g
i , X
g
i )dg − li (1)
where xgi (resp. X
g
i ) denotes the quantity of good g consumed by household
i (i = h,A) and produced by country h (resp. A), and li represents the labor
supply of household i. In (1), each variety g, g ∈ G, stands for some category
of goods, e.g., bread, cars, pork meat, or blue trousers of some given size.
Goods comprised in variety g enter the preferences of household i through
the function ugi (·), assumed to be increasing and concave with respect to its
arguments. Such goods may not be perfect substitutes because of differences
in packaging, perceived qualities or poorer information about foreign goods.
We assume that both households have identical preferences, in the sense
that ugh(X, x) = u
g
A(x,X) for all (x,X). The individual budget constraint
writes ∫
g∈G
(qgi x
g
i +Q
g
iX
g
i )dg ≤ li, i = h,A (2)
where qgi (resp. Q
g
i ) is the price of good g when consumed by household i and
produced by country h (resp. A). The producer prices are normalized to 1, so
that qgi = 1+ t
g
i and Q
g
i = 1+ T
g
i where t
g
i and T
g
i are the rates applying to g.
The problem of household i is to maximize (1) subject to (2). The sep-
arability assumptions embedded in (1) imply that the demand functions for
goods of variety g can be written xgi = x
g
i (t
g
i , T
g
i ) and X
g
i = X
g
i (t
g
i , T
g
i ), with a
slight abuse of notation. The corresponding indirect utility is
Vi =
∫
g∈G
vgi (t
g
i , T
g
i )dg, (3)
where vgi (t
g
i , T
g
i ) = u
g
i (x
g
i (t
g
i , T
g
i ), X
g
i (t
g
i , T
g
i )) − q
g
i x
g
i (t
g
i , T
g
i ) − Q
g
iX
g
i (t
g
i , T
g
i ) is
the individual contribution of variety g to i’s welfare.
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2.2 Optimal fiscal rule
The optimal fiscal rule maximizes the joint welfare Vh + VA, with t
g = T g
because of identical preferences, subject to the constraint that a given amount
R > 0 of tax is collected in each country,∫
g∈G
tg(xgi (t
g, tg) +Xgi (t
g, tg))dg ≥ R. (4)
Since xgh(t
g, tg) = XgA(t
g, tg) and xgA(t
g, tg) = Xgh(t
g, tg), both contributions
vgh(t
g, tg) and vgA(t
g, tg) are equal for any tg. Hence the optimal fiscal rule
maximizes the Lagrangean
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∫
g∈G
Lg(tg, tg, λ)dg − 2λR, (5)
where λ is the marginal cost of public funds, and
Lg(tg, tg, λ) = vgi (t
g, tg) + λtg(xgi (t
g, tg) +Xgi (t
g, tg)) (6)
for i = h,A.
If g could be taxed freely, then the optimal tax rate tg would maximize Lg
for any g. These optimal tax rates would obey a version of Ramsey’s rule, and
so they would typically differ across varieties.
Here, however, we further require that only one positive rate is available,
in addition to the zero-rate. Namely, we impose that tg = t > 0 if variety g
belongs to the tax base, and tg = 0 otherwise. With this additional constraint,
the optimal base b∗ comprises every variety g such that
Lg(t∗, t∗, λ∗) > Lg(0, 0, λ∗). (7)
In (7), the optimal rate t∗ and the corresponding marginal social cost of public
funds λ∗ satisfy the first order condition
d
dt
∫
g∈b∗
Lg(t∗, t∗, λ∗)dg = 0
and the budget constraint (4) at equality.
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2.3 Tax competition
We now turn to the case where h and A simultaneously choose their tax rules
under competition.
Assume first that the origin principle applies. Then, the tax rate bearing
on any good is the one of the country where this good has been produced,
i.e. tgh = t
g
A = t
g and T gh = T
g
A = T
g. Adopting country h’s viewpoint, Nash
behavior implies that h takes A’s tax rule (T g; g ∈ G) as given and chooses
(tg; g ∈ G) which maximizes the indirect utility of household h,∫
g∈G
vgh(t
g, T g)dg (8)
subject to the constraints that the collected tax is at least R,∫
g∈G
tg(xgh(t
g, T g) +XgA(t
g, T g))dg ≥ R, (9)
and that only one tax rate can be used, that is, tg = t if g belongs to h’s tax
base b, and tg = 0 otherwise.
The corresponding Lagrangean function writes∫
g∈G
Lgh,or(t
g, T g, λh)dg − λhR,
where
Lgh,or(t
g, T g, λh) = v
g
h(t
g, T g) + λht
g(xgh(t
g, T g) +XgA(t
g, T g)), (10)
and λh is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget constraint (9).
Therefore, h should tax the goods of variety g produced domestically at
rate tg = t > 0 if and only if
Lgh,or(t, T
g, λh) > L
g
h,or(0, T
g, λh). (11)
Given A’s tax rule (T g; g ∈ G), the domestic tax base b, the domestic tax
rate t, and the multiplier λh are defined by (11), the budget constraint (9) at
equality, and the first order condition
∂
∂tg
∫
g∈b
Lgh,or(t, T
g, λh)dg = 0. (12)
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Equations (9) at equality, (11) and (12) define h’s tax rule (t, b) which is the
best-response to any given rule (T,B) in country A. The best-response (T,B)
of A to the tax rule chosen by h is defined similarly.
In a symmetric equilibrium, t = T, b = B and λh = λA = λ. In this
equilibrium, in each country, either the domestic and the foreign components
of variety g are taxed, or they are both exempted. Hence, a symmetric Nash
equilibrium under the origin principle (tor, bor, λor) satisfies
Lgi,or (tor, tor, λor) > L
g
i,or (0, tor, λor) , for g ∈ bor, (13)
Lgi,or (0, 0, λor) ≥ L
g
i,or (tor, 0, λor) , for g ∈ G\bor. (14)
for i = h,A.
We are now in a position to assess optimality properties of the fiscal rule
under the origin principle. Since both representative households are identical,
we have Lgi,or (t
g, tg, λ) = Lg (tg, tg, λ), where Lg is defined by (6). However,
as is clear from (6) and (10), Lgi,or (0, t, λ) and L
g
i,or (t, 0, λ) respectively differ
from Lg (0, t, λ) and Lg (t, 0, λ). Therefore, there is no reason why the base
bor under the origin principle should coincide with the optimal one, b
∗. This
implies in turn that, under this principle of taxation, the equilibrium tax rate
tor and the associated marginal social cost of public funds λor will not be set
optimally.
By contrast, under the destination principle, the equilibrium is socially
optimal. Under this principle, each country chooses the rate of tax applying
to every good consumed at home, i.e. tgi = T
g
i = t
g for every g. Hence, country
i now maximizes ∫
g∈G
vgi (t
g, tg)dg (15)
under the budget constraint∫
g∈G
tg(xgi (t
g, tg) +Xgi (t
g, tg))dg ≥ R. (16)
The Lagrangean of this problem coincides with Lg, up to a (positive) scalar
factor, as (5) and (6) show. This proves the statement that the equilibrium
rule and the optimal one coincide.
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It follows that:
Proposition 1. Assume that there is only one positive tax rate, in addition
to the zero-rate. Then, the optimal tax rule, i.e., the rate and the base which
maximize the joint welfare of both countries, coincides with the one that is
chosen under the destination principle. This rule differs, however, from the
one that is chosen under the origin principle.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is simple. As (15) and (16) highlight,
domestic welfare under the destination principle neither depends on the foreign
tax rate nor the foreign base. As a result, all possible pressures from fiscal
competition do vanish.
Under the origin principle, this is no longer the case since the foreign tax
rate influences the price of varieties consumed domestically. Nevertheless, at
this level of generality, it seems difficult to assess more precisely how both fiscal
rules differ. It might be that too many commodities are taxed in equilibrium.
It might as well be that the equilibrium rate is too high. The next section
provides insights into this issue by focusing attention on the mobility of taxable
commodities.
3 International mobility
It is often claimed that substitution between domestic and foreign goods plays
a crucial role in the shape of the fiscal base. In order to discuss this role, we
set
ugi (xi, Xi) =
1
ρ (g)
ln(x
ρ(g)
i +X
ρ(g)
i ). (17)
Variety g is now indexed by the elasticity of substitution σ(g) between foreign
and domestic goods, with ρ(g) = 1−1/σ(g), σ(g) ≥ 0. In general, the elasticity
of substitution σ(g) between home and foreign goods of variety g varies across
varieties. This parameter can be thought of as a measure of ‘international
mobility’: the sub-utility ugi approaches a Leontief when σ(g) → 0, a Cobb-
Douglas when σ(g) → 1, and becomes linear when σ(g) → ∞. Thus, the
greater σ(g) is, the more domestic and foreign goods which compose variety g
are close substitutes.
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Since complementarity between goods of the same variety is not relevant,
we shall restrict our study to σ(g) ≥ 1. When σ(g) = 1, the domestic (resp.
foreign) demand addressed to domestic (resp. foreign) goods of variety g only
relies on the domestic price qg = 1 + tg (resp. Qg = 1 + T g); this seems to
be more suitable for items such as ‘Public Transport’. As the elasticity of
substitution σ(g) rises, domestic and foreign goods of variety g become more
sensible to the difference between qg and Qg.
In (17), utility is logarithmic with respect to varieties. It follows that a
comprehensive base should be socially desirable. Indeed, (7) rewrites
ln (1 + t∗) < λ∗
t∗
1 + t∗
. (18)
Since this inequality does not depend on σ(g), all commodities should be taxed
at the social optimum.
We have consequently shown:
Proposition 2. If only one tax rate can be used, in addition to the zero-rate,
then all commodities should be taxed at social optimum.
It is commonly argued that fiscal competition under the origin principle
does result in too low rates. This is not the case here.
With the specification (17), it is readily verified that the contribution
Lgh,or(t
g, T g, λ) of variety g to welfare of country h writes
1
σ(g)− 1
ln((qg)1−σ(g) + (Qg)1−σ(g))− 1 + 2λi
qg − 1
qg
(qg)1−σ(g)
(qg)1−σ(g) + (Qg)1−σ(g)
.
The contribution LgA,or is obtained by switching q
g = 1 + tg and Qg = 1 + T g
in the above expression. Appealing to (13), a variety g must be taxed in a
symmetric Nash equilibrium under the origin principle when Lgi,or(t, t, λ) >
Lgi,or(0, t, λ), for i = h,A, which is here equivalent to
λ
t
1 + t
> F T (σ(g)) ≡
1
σ(g)− 1
ln
(
1 + (1 + t)σ(g)−1
2
)
.
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Similarly, using (14), a variety g must be exempted if and only if Lgi,or(t, 0, λ) ≤
Lgi,or(0, 0, λ), for i = h,A, that is
λ
t
1 + t
≤ FG\T (σ(g)) ≡
1 + (1 + t)σ(g)−1
2 (1− σ(g))
ln
1 + (1 + t)1−σ(g)
2
.
Relevant properties of F T (σ) and FG\T (σ) are listed in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. For σ > 1, F T (σ) and FG\T (σ) are increasing with respect to σ,
F T (σ) < FG\T (σ), and
lim
σ→1+
F T (σ) = lim
σ→1+
FG\T (σ) =
1
2
ln (1 + t) .
Proof. Let x = (1 + t)σ−1 > 1. Then,
dF T (σ)
dσ
> 0⇔ G(x) = ln
(
1 + x
2
)
−
x lnx
1 + x
< 0.
Since G(1) = 0 and G′(x) < 0 for x > 1, we have G(x) < 0 for x > 1. This
shows that F T (σ) is increasing with σ for any σ > 1. Moreover,
dFG\T (σ)
dσ
> 0⇔ H (x) = (x+ 1− x lnx) ln
(
1 + x
2x
)
+ lnx > 0.
It is easy to check that, for x > 1, H ′ (x) has the same sign as
I (x) =
1
1 + x
− ln
(
1 + x
2x
)
,
The monotonicity property of FG\T (σ) then follows from the fact that I(x) <
0, for x > 1 (since I(·) is increasing for x > 1 and I(∞) = 0). Finally, remark
that
F T (σ)− FG\T (σ) < 0⇔ J(x) = ln
(
1 + x
2
)
+
1 + x
2
ln
1 + x
2x
< 0,
which is true since J(1) = J ′(1) = 0, and J ′′(x) < 0 for x > 1, so that J(x) < 0
for x > 1. Appealing to L’Hospital rule completes the proof. 
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This result allows us to characterize the equilibrium fiscal base under the
origin principle. As is illustrated in Figure 1, there exist two thresholds σ¯ and
σˆ < σ¯. If, in any given variety g such that σ(g) < σˆ, goods produced abroad
are taxed, then domestic goods should be taxed; if, on the contrary, foreign
goods in this variety are exempted, then domestic goods should be taxed at
home. Therefore, in a symmetric equilibrium, all components of this variety
will necessarily be taxed in both countries. By the same argument, any variety
σ(g) ≥ σ¯ will be tax-free in both countries, while varieties σˆ ≤ σ(g) < σ¯ can
be either taxed or exempted in both countries.
V
1
)1ln(
2
1
t
t
t1O
V 
)(VTF
)(\ VTGF
V
Figure 1: Equilibrium fiscal base
Proposition 3. Under the origin principle, in any symmetric equilibrium,
there exist two threshold elasticities of substitution σˆ and σ¯, with σˆ < σ¯, such
that all varieties g with σ(g) < σˆ are taxed, and all varieties g with σ(g) ≥ σ¯
are exempted.
The fiscal base under the origin principle does not comprise all varieties.
It is too narrow with respect to the optimal fiscal base, and consequently the
equilibrium tax rate is too high.
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4 Two extensions
4.1 A tax reform perspective
There is a related literature on Pareto improving tax harmonization under the
destination principle (Keen, 1987) or the origin principle (Lopez-Garcia, 1996,
1998). Its purpose is to examine, from a tax reform perspective, whether
small adjustments of tax rates toward a common structure may lead to a
Pareto improvement. There are actually constraints on the levels of VAT rates
in the EU. For instance, the standard VAT rate must be at least 15% and,
by political commitment, it must be less than 25%. Though this may justify
the examination of whether a form of convergence across VAT rates should be
implemented, such constraints clearly do not prevent significant divergences
among the rates of VAT.
The main legal restriction in the EU imposes on Member States the use
of a small number of different tax rates. In this circumstance, Proposition 2
suggests that the optimal fiscal base is likely to be large. Since, by Proposition
3, the equilibrium rate of tax is too high under the origin principle, it seems
natural to examine whether a small reduction of the standard rate may increase
welfare in both countries.
To discuss this point, assume that h and A are initially in a symmetric
Nash equilibrium under the origin principle. They have the same tax rate
and the same tax base. For notational convenience, let varieties be ranked by
increasing order of substitution elasticities, i.e. σ(g) < σ(g′) for g < g′. Let
also g¯ be the threshold variety such that the initial tax base comprises any g
with σ(g) ≤ σ(g¯). By Proposition 3, it must be that σˆ ≤ σ(g¯) < σ¯.
If the tax rate level is modified by a small amount dt in both countries, the
budget constraint (9) implies that, in order to collect the required amount of
tax, the base must be adjusted by dg¯ such that
t(xg¯i (t, t) +X
g¯
j (t, t))dg¯ +
∂
∂t
[
t
∫
g≤g¯
(xgi (t, t) +X
g
j (t, t))dg
]
dt = 0 (19)
for i = h,A and j 6= i. In the ‘non-crazy case’ (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956),
a decrease in tax rate (dt < 0) leads to a decrease in the amount of collected
tax. Therefore, the fiscal base must be enlarged (dg¯ > 0) and thus becomes
closer to the optimal one.
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The initial level of welfare
V =
∫
g≤g¯
vg(t, t)dg +
∫
g≥g¯
vg(0, 0)dg
is identical in both countries. As a result, the reform (dt, dg¯) implies the same
welfare change dV in both countries, with
dV =
(∫ t
0
∂
∂τ
vg¯(τ, τ)dτ
)
dg¯ +
(∫
g≤g¯
∂
∂t
vg(t, t)dg
)
dt.
Using Roy’s identity, the budget constraint (19), and the fact that xgh(t, t) =
Xgh(t, t) = x
g
A(t, t) = X
g
A(t, t) ≡ x
g (t, t) in the initial situation, we obtain
1
2
dV
dt
=
∂
∂t
(
t
∫
g≤g¯
xg(t, t)dg
)∫ t
0
xg¯(τ, τ)
txg¯(t, t)
dτ −
∫
g≤g¯
xg(t, t)dg.
Hence, for dt < 0,
dV > 0⇔
∂
∂t
(
t
∫
g≤g¯
xg(t, t)dg
)∫ t
0
xg¯(τ, τ)
txg¯(t, t)
dτ <
∫
g≤g¯
xg(t, t)dg.
This inequality will be satisfied if the initial base, which appears in the RHS,
is initially large enough, while the amount of collected tax is not too sensitive
to a change in tax rate.
With the specification (17), we have xg(t, t) = 1/2(1 + t) for all g ≤ g¯
in the initial symmetric equilibrium. Thus, dV > 0 ⇔ ln(1 + t) < t. Since
this inequality is always satisfied (for t > 0 initially), any reform that imposes
a small reduction in the tax rate in both countries, accompanied with an
adjustment of the fiscal base such that the collected tax remains unchanged,
is Pareto-improving.
The argument shows that the result does not rely on the initial position of
the economy at the outset of the reform. It only makes use of the fact that the
government budget constraints are initially binding. This property suggests
that a dynamic process of tax reforms should impose a reduction in the level
of the tax rate until the optimal base is achieved.
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4.2 Price elasticities
In a closed economy, the Ramsey’s rule closely relies on domestic price elastic-
ities. In order to take this point into account, let (17) be
ugi (xi, Xi) =
ε(g)
ε(g)− 1
(
x
ρ(g)
i +X
ρ(g)
i
) ε(g)−1
ε(g)
σ(g)
σ(g)−1
.
Variety g is characterized by its own price elasticity ε(g) and the elasticity of
substitution σ(g) across goods in this variety. Then the equilibrium base under
the origin principle comprises variety g only if Lgi,or(t, t, λ) > L
g
i,or(0, t, λ), for
i = h,A, which is equivalent to λt/(1 + t) > F T (ε(g), σ(g)), with
F T (ε, σ) =
1
ε− 1
((
qσ−1 + 1
2
) ε−1
σ−1
− 1
)
. (20)
Similarly, variety g is exempted only if Lgi,or(0, 0, λ) ≥ L
g
i,or(t, 0, λ), for i = h,A,
or equivalently λt/(1 + t) ≤ FG\T (ε(g), σ(g)), where
FG\T (ε, σ) =
1
ε− 1
qσ−1 + 1
2
((
2
q1−σ + 1
) ε−1
σ−1
− 1
)
. (21)
One can check that F T (ε, σ) and FG\T (ε, σ) increase with ε. Hence, as
depicted in Figure 2, varieties with high (resp. low) price elasticities are ex-
empted (resp. taxed) in equilibrium.
The threshold elasticities of substitution σˆ and σ¯ characterized in Propo-
sition 3 are obtained when the price elasticity ε equals 1. More generally, the
dashed curve separates the plane in two regions: region TT comprises varieties
(ε(g), σ(g)) for which domestic goods are taxed when foreign goods are taxed,
i.e. satisfying inequality (20), while region ET comprises varieties (ε(g), σ(g))
for which domestic goods are tax-free when foreign goods are taxed. Similarly,
the solid bold curve separates region EE, where inequality (21) is satisfied,
from region ET . Therefore, in equilibrium, varieties whose representative point
stands below the solid bold curve (in TT ∩TE) are taxed and those above the
dashed curve (in ET ∩ EE) are exempted.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium fiscal base with heterogenous price elasticities
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